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Essay
Sketches for a New Law School
by
CHRISTOPHER T. MATrHEWS*
I entered law school two and one-half years ago, looking forward to
a legal education. I was excited, yet afraid that I might not measure up
to such a demanding study. My fears were misplaced, however; the
school itself has not measured up. "Legal education" is neither suffi-
ciently legal nor sufficiently educational. The traditional law school is a
monolith with a virtual stranglehold on the educational process, Has-
tings is merely the site of my encounter with this process. The problems
discussed here are endemic to all law schools, with some slight variation.
This student's "worm's-eye" view of legal education today is offered to
counter the unreflective arrogance of the view from on high.
The school's failure to deliver a legal education does not prevent
individuals from enjoying and benefiting from the experience; one can,
and hopefully does, make the most of any situation. But while personal
success stories may transcend the institutional bias, they do not refute
criticism of that bias. Legal education is predicated upon unexamined
assumptions that survive only through the loving conservatorship of the
institution that depends upon those assumptions for its survival.
Law school prides itself on teaching students to "think like law-
yers." Thus defined, the school rejects two significant aspects of its self.
Law school deems its critical and analytical processes unique to the law,
denying that "thinking like a lawyer" is just thinking. And by teaching
only how to think, and not how to do, it denigrates the profession it
serves. These basic rejections leave the school in a vacuum of its own
devise.
How the school teaches is affected profoundly by these fundamental
denials. Alone with its traditions and myths, the school honors its dead
by teaching its living in a manner that is ultimately unfair. The school
* Member, Third Year Class.
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and the profession remain closed systems, blind to the possibilities of
change, locked in congratulatory and exclusive self-perpetuation.
This essay envisions a very different law school. After examining, in
Part One, some of the deficiencies in what, and how, the traditional law
school teaches, Part Two provides an alternative model of a law school,
designed to both respond to the perceived problems and to instigate dis-
cussion of the assumptions on which the current edifice so comfortably
rests. Drawing on the many lessons and inspirations that the school cur-
rently avoids, from the practical to the philosophical, it will define it-
self-and hence the law-inclusively rather than exclusively. A two year
interdisciplinary survey of thought and practice provides the instruc-
tional core, supplemented by the students' own experience in governing
themselves. Grades would be non-existent, but all students would be re-
quired to meet threshold levels of competence set higher than current
passing standards. In the third year students would do advanced
projects of their own design, allowing them to choose their area of prac-
tice by specific expertise rather than class caste. This program will be
more difficult than the current curriculum, but it will provide students
with the opportunity to actually get a "legal education."
I. Law School Confidential
Many articles have been written on problems within legal education,
from differing academic points of view. A symposium on The Law Cur-
riculum in the 1980s was published in the Journal of Legal Education in
1982. Surprisingly, all four contributors agreed that "there must be
greater emphasis upon both the broader theoretical underpinning of law
and legal systems and the practical role and tasks of the lawyer .... "I
But while educators share my concerns about the state of the art today,
many of their proposals reveal unstated political agendas. 2 This essay
1. As noted in the Introduction, Gorman, Legal Education at the End of the Century:
An Introduction, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 319 (1982) (emphasis in original) (referring to the
following series of articles); Brest, A First-Year Course in the "Lawyering Process", 32 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 344 (1982); Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 321 (1982); Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 336 (1982); Michelman, The Parts and the Whole.: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry,
32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352 (1982).
2. Critical legal scholars, for example, suggest that the new school inevitably must be
politically correct, substituting their subjective truth for the current version. They believe that,
somehow, the exposure of doctrine as oppressive can transform law into a tool for social
change. I wish they were right, but suspect that they will only manufacture new doctrine.
Programming would continue at CLSU, only the catch-phrases would be different.
Duncan Kennedy, however, deserves credit for two contributions to the discourse, his
student essay How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 71
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proposes a relatively neutral alternative, intended to be a positive change
from any perspective.
A. All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go
Contrary to the opinion of legal educators, "thinking like a lawyer"
is not a phenomenon unique to the profession. It is just critical thinking
dressed up in a dark gray suit, a white shirt, and a red "power" tie. The
outfit is decidedly male. Although in the past women were denied the
opportunity to wear it, today they are welcome to mentally cross-dress.
A new vocabulary and a few garden variety skills buy the wardrobe;
it is kept pressed and starched by careful separation from any potentially
wrinkling context. But the clothes make the mind; critical thinking cops
an attitude. The uniform gives the appearance of objectivity, when in
reality legal reasoning is as subjective as everything else in this world.
Students are attracted to that air of authority a well-dressed mind pos-
sesses; they forget their own hard-earned subjectivity-their personal val-
ues-in the face of such a convincing fashion statement. Putting on the
intellectual uniform becomes a short cut to gaining mental stature from
wisdom.
The uniform protects the student from embracing the true complex-
ity of legal questions. One can quantify blithely the value of death, or
ascertain legislative intent as if an answer exists. The limited range of
accepted perspectives prevents the sparking of new and inventive re-
sponses to legal problems. "Thinking like a lawyer" denies the value of
other ways of looking at things in our universe, including intuition, dif-
fering world views, or consensus. Law school resists such disruption to
its plan to dress the student for success; that suit simply does not look
right with a Mohawk.
The school breaks students of original thought through orchestrated
peer pressure. The requisite degree of complicity formalizes the accept-
ance of the uniform. A story from my first year section illustrates the
process.
At the beginning of the year, one young student constantly surprised
the others with her unique way of seeing things, interjecting unconsid-
ered perspectives into the class discussion. Initially, she was admired for
her breadth of vision. But professors soon made it clear, through their
(1970), and his continued concern with those issues after he crossed over to the professorial
side, evident in his infamous little red book, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983), which should be required reading at
new student orientations as long as the school continues in its current form. It offers a healthy,
skeptical view of how law school intimidates and indoctrinates its initiates.
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arsenal of subtle and direct signals, that she was disrupting, rather than
contributing to, the learning experience. She was humored for a while, as
a nostalgic throwback to recently discarded adolescence. But as the year
progressed, students began resenting her and her "digressions" because
she robbed them of the time they desperately felt they needed to find out
what the teacher wanted them to know. Her commentary became more
vociferous in response to the palpable dislike. Teachers, now armed with
clear class approval, treated her disrespectfully; students sneered and
jeered. She became the ritual sacrifice of the section's rite of passage. In
second and third year classes, few behaved so naively.
Law school ignores criticism of "thinking like a lawyer" by resting
on its trivial circular triumph. The school asserts a tautology; since it
always has taught all lawyers how to think, it teaches students how to
"think like lawyers." With a monopoly on a desired credential, the
school is relatively immune to pressure from students to improve; it
basks in its structural security.
3
While the law school devotes itself to dressing students' minds ap-
propriately, it never deals with the obvious question-appropriately for
what? Understandably, a student can enter the school with no idea what
a lawyer does (except what she has learned by watching Perry Mason or
L.A. Law). Amazingly, one can graduate without finding out more. The
school is too busy teaching students how to "think like lawyers" to pro-
vide insight into where, when, or how this valuable skill is used.
This professional/academic split has led to the single biggest change
in the legal curriculum-the development of clinical instruction. While
current clinical programs are welcome, they are simply too little, too late:
too little because they are not required courses, and usually are utilized
by the committed rather than the confused; too late because the first year
transformation already has occurred without any professional grounding.
Thanks to the law school's fear of being considered a "mere trade
school," students are left untrained and unable to make informed career
choices. They are unprepared for the otherwise unsurprising fact that
law is work (like all work, whatever color the collar, or whether it calls
itself a "profession" or a "trade"). The pejorative "mere" reflects only
the school's myopic abhorrence; the trade itself is full of excitement and
possibility if one is open to it. But the school sets the student up for
disappointment by providing unrealistic expectations for life after law
school, which is unlikely to resemble a steady diet of appellate opinions.
4
3. Like the phone company of our youth, the school operates by the unwritten rule-we
don't care, we don't have to.
4. The dance of the school and the profession is reminiscent of young couples taking the
[Vol. 40
If house painters were required to graduate from art school, they
would need both further training and adjustment of their expectations of
what and how they would paint. Law school often is even less relevant
to practice than a studio art course is to housepainting. It is more akin to
requiring house painters to study art history-never picking up a brush.
In this world, house painting students and law students alike must learn
everything after school. Consequently, such schools fail to meet the
larger objective of training their students for the demands of their
careers.
Many professors themselves have never picked up the metaphorical
brush-star student to keeper of the flame without missing a beat. The
law school's self-absorption becomes incestuous as it desires and keeps its
best and brightest for itself. By cutting the actual practice of law out of
the loop entirely, the school sends a clear message to the student: Prac-
tice is what you have to do if you are not special enough for us to keep
you. The profession that the school ostensibly serves becomes a giant
pond into which the school throws back the thousands of little ones that
end up in its nets. Ironically, the star student may be the least qualified
to teach. In the higher calling of baseball, everyone knows that the mar-
ginal players who had to learn to stay in the game make the best manag-
ers. The superstars often cannot teach because they never had to be
taught.
Professors who never practiced,5 or only put their toes in the water
before deciding it was too cold, communicate not only their own impor-
tance, but their ignorance, fear, and even disgust concerning the "dirty"
realities of practice.6 Both the faculty and the curriculum itself fail to
educate students about the dramatically different career options available
in law. The school merely provides career services on the side as if what
and how one learns is not central to any choice. But career services are a
poor substitute for the direct exposure that is unavailable in substantive
classes. One cannot understand estate work without drafting a will, or
recognize the nature of criminal practice without sitting in on arraign-
ments and plea bargain negotiations. While Criminal Procedure raises
fascinating constitutional issues, it does not assist a student in making an
plunge into marriage after a whirlwind courtship. They do not know if they are compatible or
not, and often have trouble adjusting to mundane reality. The high professional divorce rate-
lawyers leaving practice-demonstrates this phenomenon.
5. As a student, I realize that I also have not practiced, limiting my perspective on this
subject.
6. Although many organizations would rather train their own, the school should not
abdicate its responsibility to all its students, especially those who will not join such
organizations.
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intelligent choice between civil and criminal practice. Students end up
with only the myths of practice, which hide the breadth of information
that the school could provide. 7 Too often, the student takes one arbi-
trary first step and is on that track for life.
Since the school sends students out unskilled, they must find a de
facto apprenticeship themselves. Because schools fail to include it in the
curriculum, however, not all students are provided with this opportunity.
Typically, economic reality mandates that only two types of organiza-
tions can afford to do the school's work for it-the government and the
law firm, both of which are large enough to absorb the cost. The appren-
ticeship process usually begins during the crucial summer job after the
second year. The school, through career services, ostensibly assists the
student in finding this job through the on-campus interview process.
But, in truth, the school is assisting the large employers, granting them
free advertising and first pick of the students.
Part of the problem is the unitary bar concept: the illusion that,
with a few exceptions, every lawyer is ready and able to do any kind of
work. The profession insists that law is a general study. It is not. No one
actually practices all kinds of law, nor should they. The law is a large
and varied universe, with many particular studies within its scope.
Whether the bar or the school is to blame for this unitary bar notion, the
loser of this chicken/egg debate is the student.
Presumably, the law school trains students to practice any type of
law; in reality, it only trains them to be general law students. This train-
ing is doubly ineffective for actual practice in a specific area of law. Stu-
dents matriculate with the sort of general knowledge more appropriate to
a non-professional degree. But these "bachelors of law" are deemed wor-
thy of a J.D. (perhaps the D stands for dilettante?). Instead of now pur-
suing specific expertise in an academic environment, neophyte lawyers
must seek essential aspects of their education from other lawyers (as em-
ployers), with the quality of training varying dramatically.
Lawyers would line up to sue other professionals if necessary train-
ing for those professions were left up to a similar happenstance. But
lawyers made the rules for themselves differently than those for others;
demonstrating a delicate sensitivity to their own tough situation, while
unrelentingly demanding higher standards from non-lawyers.
7. The myths often function as post hoc justifications for paths taken (by choice or de-
fault), for example: large firm practice is more intellectually challenging; or, plaintiff's per-
sonal injury work redistributes wealth.
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B. Bad Food and Small Portions Too
Two works about attending law school are part of our popular cul-
ture. Significantly, both The Paper Chase and IL, 8 focus exclusively on
the first year. Although the world has changed inexorably in the hun-
dred years since Christopher Columbus Langdell discovered the modem
law school, the first year has not. This entrenched groundwork effec-
tively defeats the modem improvements to years two and three; while
students do embrace later aspects of legal education, they already have
been both molded and conclusively judged and sorted on the sacred core
alone. First things first-only more so when first things count most too.
A typical three year program might start by laying a foundation of
basic skills and information for all students, so that whatever their back-
ground and experience they could all start off on the right foot. Then,
through more advanced study in particular areas, they could further
demonstrate their individual strengths and weaknesses. The law school.
ostensibly does exactly that, but by classifying students as winners and
losers during the ground-laying stage, it destroys one of the purposes of
the foundation it is laying. The school serves as a talent scout rather
than as a teacher, and the remaining study becomes less meaningful.
Historically, the front loading was designed as a positive feature-to
assist in the screening process of an institution with open admissions.
Times have changed, however, and students now are pre-screened. But
the effect of early judgment is still present. After classification based on
first year performance, a student spends the next two years in one of two
parallel universes. The "good" student attends Dr. Jekyll's law school,
while the "bad" student is sent to Mr. Hyde's. The good doctor provides
respect, personal contact, opportunity, and support. His alter ego dishes
out insult, isolation, and inevitably, self-doubt. 9 Even if the school accu-
rately could gauge professional potential, this institutional neglect of half
its population, stigmatized by the school itself, is inexcusable.
No other study values initial performance over final. Law school
itself does not select its aspirants by their freshman, as opposed to senior,
8. Authored by John Osborn (1971) and Scott Turow (1978), respectively.
9. For example, Mr. Hyde's world does not include journal participation. Assuming
that to be a valuable educational experience, it is denied expressly to those who have demon-
strated the greatest need of it. The ineligible must suffer through their parallel universe peers,
bonding together in the masochistic excitement of their honored servitude, and listen to them
gleefully complain about the horrors of the opportunity.
The supposed journal standards demonstrate another myth-that journals exist for the
student, like the high school yearbook or some mutant Junior Achievement project. The
proliferation of "scholarly" publications serves the faculty best, virtually guaranteeing that
anyone can call themselves a "scholar."
July 1989]
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grades.10 The school ends up judging only how easily one can slip into
the school's mental uniform and look comfortable, rather than what one
has learned through three long years of professional study. This subtle
form of discrimination hits hardest at those already disadvantaged; for it
is harder to get used to thinking like a part of the American system of
justice when you have suffered at its hand in your own life. Thus, the
school denies a legitimate opportunity to many students with one hand,
while ostensibly offering it with the other.
After the initial classification has taken place, students often tune
out and merely go through the motions. Once the challenge of learning a
few skills-disguised as "thinking like a lawyer"-is over, the classroom
is less compelling. Students may get involved in part-time jobs or clini-
cals, but classes often become trite. Student cynicism comes in part from
realizing how much of the fear and excitement of first year was done with
mirrors; "thinking like a lawyer" is straight-forward when no one is play-
ing mind games with you.
Calling those games the Socratic method imbues the instructional
process with a sense of ancient wisdom and nobility; we envision genera-
tions of professors and students risking hemlock in their quest for Truth.
If it was ever like that, it certainly is not today. The process usually is a
modified lecture with students occasionally filling in the blanks. The
value of the method depends on student/teacher interaction; bereft of it,
it makes little sense.
Assuming for the moment that the current methodology works well,
using it exclusively is another form of discrimination. People differ in
their responses to various types of learning experiences. Even if no
method reaches a larger audience than the Socratic, other methods will
reach a different audience. "
Unless the school claims that the Socratic method is somehow more
appropriate to the successful study of law, it has no grounds for denying
access to others. And make no mistake about it, how well one does in
law school is all about access. There is a caste system that matches dif-
10. First year law students also resemble freshpersons in college in that they similarly are
thrown into a new environment likely to effect their initial performance, further reason to
delay definitive classification.
11. This essay can hardly begin to describe the variety of interesting, different methodolo-
gies being used in the larger educational universe. A few law schools have experimented suc-
cessfully, including Stanford (Curriculum B) and Montana (the Montana Plan). See generally,
Brest, A First-Year Course in the "Lawyering Process" 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 344 (1982) (discus-
sion of Curriculum B); Bahls, STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1989 at 24 (description of the Mon-
tana Plan).
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ferent kinds of practice to different levels of academic performance.' 2
The person who might shine under a different pedagogical method is
pigeonholed by the school today as someone who doesn't quite "get it."
While he may eventually become a very successful lawyer, he must over-
come the hurdles that the school has placed in his path, including mak-
ing him doubt his own abilities
The school cannot claim its methodology is justified by any external
policy because it has already written such concerns out of the system.
The school simply selects its own image-mirror, mirror on the wall,
who is the fairest of them all. In fact, students who respond better to a
"hands-on" approach, for example, may make better lawyers. Addition-
ally, students who study a broader contextual fabric may help the profes-
sion define itself more globally. The school lets students try these hats
on, but only after assigning them to a caste, which may preclude them
from ever demonstrating their strengths.
The reason the law school does not include new approaches in the
core curriculum is a combination of belief in its own tautology-if [by
definition] it ain't broke, don't fix it-and the unreflective assertion that
"thinking like a lawyer" is beyond the range of normal experience. Since
the school is just baby-sitting after having dressed the student to pass in
the corridors of power, it. is acceptable to play silly educational games
once the "real" program has established who's who and what's what.
The only silly games being played, though, are in the "real" program in
which professors impress students with professorial brilliance, rather
than helping students discover their own.
The widespread use of commercial outlines by students today
reveals that supposedly esoteric lawyerly thinking can be reduced to
formula. Something is wrong with the pedagogy when the secrets of the
kingdom, allegedly guarded by the wizards, turn out to be available on
the corner.
The general law school environment is dominated by students ob-
scenely obsessed with where they stand amongst their peers, and the
school assists them by providing the essential data. While this data may
seem necessary to employers to allow them to easily sort applicants, it is
not at all necessary educationally. Indeed, the mechanism the school
12. The most obvious example is the general choice of sides in tort litigation. The "de-
fense bar" can attract the seemingly better qualified students with high salaries and paid train-
ing during campus recruiting. The "plaintiff's side" usually is represented by smaller firms or
sole practitioners that cannot even afford to come to campus interview programs. Only the
students who are unable to find jobs through the school's program end up applying for these
jobs.
July 1989]
uses actually inhibits both learning and teaching. This anti-educational
effect is accomplished structurally through complete reliance on a final
examination, compounded by the superimposition of a grade curve.'
3
Law school grades depend entirely on an anonymous final examina-
tion with a grading curve. Having just one opportunity to demonstrate
one's worth, after the completion of the study, prevents the test from
providing any educational feedback. Since each course is a discrete
event, and each professor an idiosyncratic judge, students find there is
nothing to take from one test to another besides a pen. An interim test
would give them a chance to respond to perceived shortcomings of their
own and the professors, and to transcend their fear of the unknown. The
law school hands down the party line: If you know how to "think like a
lawyer," you have nothing to fear from this "challenge," if you do not,
you will be found out. Students are forced to hand their futures over to a
decidedly inexact authority posing as infallible.
Many faculty are good people trying their best to responsibly sort
students within the parameters of the system. They do not like the pro-
cess any better than students do. But the process protects the professors,
while exposing the students to tremendous risks. If the professor did a
good job of making things clear in class he is stuck with a flat curve and
must split hairs to decide student destinies. Or he can build questions
into the exam designed to stratify, injecting spurious mystery into the
material. Worse, but not uncommon, is the professor, snug in sinecure,
who simply does not put the requisite thought and effort into making or
reading the tests. In all these situations the student is forced to accept a
dubious, yet definitive, evaluation. While a fair exam, fairly graded, is
possible, it is a rare event unlikely to be repeated each semester.
By counting only the examination, the school disregards other crite-
ria that could be part of a fair evaluation. Perhaps if class participation
was a factor, the Socratic method would not be dead. Certainly some
recognition of verbal skills seems appropriate to the study of law.
Anonymous grading is premised on removing any hint of favoritism
or prejudice from evaluations. Once again to protect itself, the school
makes the student bear the cost. Grading decisions are completely sub-
jective, anonymous or not. They can be made thoughtfully and in good
faith, or arbitrarily and capriciously, but they always are subjective. The
presumed fairness of anonymous testing is a sham. It removes only con-
13. Most supposedly ungraded programs merely accomplish the same goal through eu-
phemisms, such as non-grade grades like High Honors and Honors.
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scious bias, leaving unconscious, cultural bias alive and well. Anonymity
is used to protect the school from having arbitrary decisions questioned.
The school's policy mirrors nineteenth century contract law by lim-
iting review to the four corners of the document. Modern law recognizes
the value of extrinsic evidence, even if the law school does not. No one
believes that vindictive or bargained-for grading has a place in any sys-
tem, but requiring anonymous testing to avoid it is ineffective, and insult-
ing to both professor and student.1 4 The freedom to temper claimed
objectivity with humanity is precious to our legal system, a basis for our
right to trial by jury, but it is lacking in legal education.
Anonymous grading also denies professors the chance to get neces-
sary feedback on the effectiveness of their testing. Under the current sys-
tem, a professor can recognize when a curve is flat or natural, but cannot
tell whether the test classified students by conceptual knowledge, the
ability to memorize minutiae, or make use of a certain commercial out-
line. When teachers finally get names to match with numbers, the trail is
cold; the specifics that would educate the professor about the effective-
ness of her testing are inaccessible.
The law school test succeeds only in its usual tautological fashion-
defining success by what it does. Whether a test is a probing examination
written and read with care, or a Dadaist exercise in fatalistic futility,
somebody gets an A and is happy, someone else does badly and feels
wronged.
A student who questions the "verdict" on her law school worth, or
even just wants to learn further from the evaluative process, is left with
little recourse. The curve precludes substantive inquiry in reliance upon
the inscrutability of relative worth.
Fair grading is a difficult and time consuming process at best, and
one that all educational institutions deal with, usually without resorting
to the sort of structural defenses the law school deems necessary. The
school's fear of a pack of complaining law students is understandable,
but if it cannot handle its own creation, something is wrong with the
picture. Dr. Frankenstein had this same problem.
14. A preferred method would be based on an assumption of equitable evaluations, but
also would provide a viable grievance mechanism in reserve.
Anonymous testing does not protect anyone from vindictive grading on content, as op-
posed to personality (or on presumed identity), nor does it protect against favoritism which
can circumvent anonymity directly (student tells the professor his number) or indirectly (stu-
dent cutely communicates his identity in his exam paper).
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11. A Different School of Thought
This essay envisions an alternative two-part program that would
provide a better legal education. The first two years establish a working
vocabulary and threshold competence-in theory and practice-for each
major area of study. The third year entails specialized, advanced work of
the student's choosing. To complete this program successfully, students
must know how to think and do, and can assert some control over their
destinies by creating their own credentials in a chosen field.
The first part of the program lays a foundation upon which all stu-
dents can build, constructed of a common language and skills, while si-
multaneously exposing students to the realities of practice in different
areas of law. To accomplish this, the school is both a teaching clinic and
a classroom. Faculty will be required to go both ways-to teach theory
and practice, neither aspect given primary status. This dual requirement
will keep scholarship grounded and practice thoughtful.
A professor will work with a group of students in a specific subject
area for a month. By rotating through the courses monthly, there is no
standard sequence that mandates prioritization. 15 The unique nature of
each segment will frustrate the use of commercial outlines. Students sim-
ply will have to engage the material during the process instead. The ma-
terial will be presented intensively, each subject studied full-time during
its month. During that time, the material can be defined and approached
in many ways: case study, work on actual cases, related readings from
other disciplines or fiction, written assignments, journals, interviews, and
observing proceedings, for example. The method of study can be both
humanistic 16 and practical, unlike the current method which is neither.
There will be no attempt to cover an entire subject; the focus instead will
be on thoroughly understanding a few examples well enough to be able to
understand others on one's own. 17
Near the end of each month, the professor will evaluate each student
subjectively, but openly, using some combination of written, oral, and
performance testing. While not offering the illusion of objectivity, this
15. There are educational reasons why some courses should precede others, but law
school prioritization currently ranks the common law over statutory law, and all law over
interdisciplinary study. The new school would vary those types of study within general educa-
tional levels.
16. See, e.g., E. DVORKIN, J. HIMMELSTEIN, H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A
HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
17. Students would need further preparation for the various bar examinations, as they do
now. Bar preparation should be part of the curriculum, however, so that it can be included in
financial aid packages. Today, students often accept jobs earlier than they might, limiting their
options, in order to survive the bar review summer.
[Vol. 40
A NEW LAW SCHOOL
will increase accountability and reinforce fairness through a visible deci-
sion-making process. Each student must meet the professor's threshold
competence standard or the group does not go on to the next subject. If
someone does not establish competence, the ones who have done so will
tutor their classmate for re-testing. They can learn teamwork skills that
will be important later, while honing their own understanding through
teaching.
If a student protests his evaluation, resolution of the problem be-
comes a group project. Students get a very real and personal chance to
mediate a dispute.' Governing their own group, students will have to
deal with law from the other side, and realize some of the complexity of
the issues-a good cure for self-righteousness or indifference.
No grades are given out, but everyone has achieved a level similar to
what the professor used to call a B or higher. This is possible through,
for example, skills teaching, an ego-less yet effective method for provid-
ing everyone with skills they otherwise would not learn if they remained
in the bottom of the class. 19
The teaching clinic will be less compartmentalized than the current
external programs. Interdisciplinary communication will keep the qual-
ity of work on the cutting edge. When free services are needed, the
school can be a community resource. It also can assist the courts, or,
when neither is appropriate, mock projects can be developed.
After spending a month in an area, students will possess two essen-
tial types of knowledge. They will understand the working language and
skills of the law and its shortcomings-what it does and what it does not
do-and they will know whether they liked doing that kind of work. At
this juncture, they will be better qualified for summer jobs than students
18. The group will have to design its own governmental process. For example, in a stu-
dent/teacher dispute, shall there be a presumption of regularity in the teacher's decision?
What will be the scope and standard of review? Review by whom-the whole class, a commit-
tee of students, a committee of faculty and students?
Students may have to decide in what situations they will cast someone out of the group:
for being slow, for not trying (how do you prove that), or for being a pain in the neck. What
mechanism should be used for this ultimate decision: majority rule, supermajority, consensus,
or some veto or appeal mechanism? What will happen to that student afterward, and how
much will the group concern itself with that fate? These problems will bring legal policy and
procedural issues to life for the students.
19. This method was tried in one law school through a class called Contorts, a mixture of
Contracts and Torts offered on an experimental basis at Rutgers-Camden. The class was a
pedagogical success, but controversial within the Rutgers legal academic community. See
Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEo. L.J. 875 (1985); see also Feinman &
Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 528
(1985) (the pedagogy without the politics).
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today. They then must take the initiative and decide what they will
make of their third year.
The third year provides students both the opportunity and the re-
sponsibility to write their own curriculum. Being visibly smart will no
longer suffice to open all doors. Instead of being a jaded lame duck, the
third year student will be entering the most demanding phase of her
study-and the demands will be her own. Choosing one or more areas of
law that interest her and delving into them more deeply, she will create
projects that communicate her affinity with, and commitment to, the ma-
terial. Possibilities include exposing maladministered justice, designing a
computer program to improve a particular type of practice's efficiency,
writing a theoretical article, working on an appeal, or writing a book
enabling nonlawyers to function in the legal system.
20
No student can slide through the year without both engaging the
material and gaining insight from deep, close study that a general educa-
tion never brings. Coupled with the breadth of the first phase, the school
attempts to offer the best of both worlds-far-ranging knowledge and
hard-earned understanding.
After finishing his projects, the student will have a valuable creden-
tial-relevant examples of his own work. He will have references of
weight as well, because professors worked closely with him, and they will
have credibility outside of academic circles because of their involvement
in practice.
There will be no grades; instead employers will have to examine the
type of information for which grades are just a poor proxy. 2' This avoids
the inequities of the current system, without sacrificing useful informa-
tion. Initially, the oppression of monopolistic law school action will fall
on the employers (instead of the student), but they will eventually realize
that they are getting a better deal-applicants who know what they are
applying for and know they want to do it. There will be less unhappy
matching and less attrition.
The changes proposed here are sweeping, and undoubtedly will en-
gender criticism from student and school alike. But they are worth try-
ing, even if they make the process initially more difficult for all
concerned, for the current system is a poorly designed workout. Stu-
20. Students still uncertain about what type of practice they would like to embark on,
and there should be fewer such students given the greater information available, can either do
a variety of smaller projects, or projects of a general nature.
21. For that summer job after year two, no longer as necessary, employers will receive
relevant references and examples of work from various student projects to assist them in select-
ing clerks.
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dents labor like weightlifters; their motto--"no pain, no gain." But what
they gain is not worth the struggle. The new law school sketched here
seeks to create a system in which the hard work pays off at every level.
Students will have to work hard and long, as they do today. But they
will earn a reward for their efforts that is currently unavailable-a real
legal education.

